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IN THE SUPR-EME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ECHO NEY, TRUSTEE, 
WASATCH HOMES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
G. T. HARRISON and 
ALDA J. HARRISON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8437 
This is an action to recover a real estate commis-
sion. The claim was assigned to the plaintiff, Echo N ey. 
Wasatch Homes, Inc., a real estate broker's firm, ob-
tained purchasers for the Snow Apartments, an apart-
ment house owned by Aida J. Harrison and G. T. Har-
rison, the defendants herein. No listing agreement was 
signed; however, an earnest money receipt and agree-
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ment admitted as Exhibit P-1 was executed, providing 
for the payment of a commission and for the payment 
of a reasonable attonwy 's fee in the event of a breach 
of the contract. The sellers and buyers performed the 
earnest money agreement, except that the sellers refused 
to pay the real estate commission provided for in said 
agreement. rrhe sale ·was consummated and transfer of 
title made to the buyers. 
The district court ruled that the plaintiff could not 
reeover beeause there was no listing agreement ever 
executed between the sellers and the real estate broker 
and, therefore, there existed no contract upon which the 
broker could recover. A judgment by default was 
obtained against Aida J. Harrison on December 9, 1953. 
On September 21, 1954 a notice of the judgment and 
demand for payment was sent to .Mrs. Harrison, and she 
replied by letter refusing t9 pay the judgment and 
stating that she would ignore any further efforts to 
collect the judgment. (See Ex. 3-P.) 
On the 30th day of October Aida J. Harrison filed 
a motion to set aside the judgment, and said motion was 
granted solely upon the affidaYit on file in this case. 
From the order setting a~ide the judgment against 
Aida J. Harrison, and from the final judgment of the 
trial court, the appellant appeals. 
POINT I. 
rrHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE 
rrHE JUDGMENT AG.AINST THE DEFENDANT, 
j\LD,\ J. HARRISON. 
rrlw defendant, Aida J. Harrison, was duly served 
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with the summons and complaint in this action on the 
12th day of November, 1953 (R. 8). This defendant did 
not answer the complaint, and on December 9, 1953 
judgment by default was granted against this defendant 
(Tr. P. 4). A demand for payment of this judgment 
was received by the defendant on September 21, 1954 
and the defendant replied by letter dated September 26, 
1954 (See Ex. 3-P). In this letter the defendant stated: 
"I am taking no action whatever in regard to 
it, so please don't bother me any more about it, 
as I am a very busy woman and would ignore any 
more efforts on your part to collect from me.'' 
On the 25th day of October, 1954 a garnishment was 
issued against First Security Bank, and on October 28, 
1954 the garnishee replied that it owed this defendant 
$2,608.97. 
On October 30, 1954 the defendant filed a motion to 
set aside the judgment. r_rhis motion was supported 
solely by the affidavit of Alda J. Harrison pleading that 
she had failed to plead in the action because she felt 
that she was protected by a divorce decree directing her 
husband to pay the commission on the sale of the Snow 
Apartments and therefore had no liability (R. 16). No 
other evidence or justification for relief from the judg-
ment was offered by the moving party. The trial court 
granted the motion and set aside the plaintiff's judgment 
solely on the strength of this affidavit. 
These facts present the narrow question of whether 
or not a belief on the part of a defendant served with 
process that he has no liability at law to the plaintiff, 
or that he has a good defense to the action is a justifica-
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tion for not pleading to the complaint. 
At common law all judgments become final after 
the close of term. Our rule 60(b) is in derogation of 
this rule. In Bickerstaff &s. Harmonica Fire Insuraucr 
Co., 133 S.W. (2d) 890 the court analyzed the effect of 
60 (b) and said: 
''The statute to vacate judgments by this pro-
('ecdiug is in derogation, not only of the common 
law, but of the very important policy of holding 
judgmentH final after the close of the term. Citi-
zens must lwce confidence in the judgments of our 
official tribunals, as settlements of their contro-
versies ; and then· should be some end to them. 
Unless the case be clearly within the spirit and 
polic·y of the act, the judgment should not be 
disturbed. 
Hule 60 (b) is intended to grant relief in certain 
cases from judgments that would have become unassail-
able at common la'x.'. Does the affidavit of the defendant, 
.._\lda Harrison, which was the sole basis for setting aside 
the judgment come 'vi thin the provisions of Rule 60(b) 1 
r:rhe affidavit sets forth two reasons why the court should 
set aside the judgment again~t her: 
1. She believed that she was not liable to the 
plaintiff. 
2. No notice of judgment was given her. 
The second basis is entirely without foundation. No 
notice of judgment is required in the district court and 
the defendant was not entitled to any notice. However, 
in this instance she was sent a notice of judgment to 
which she replied that she intended to take no action 
whatevl'l' iu regard to the judgment and would not be 
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bothered any rnore about it (See Ex. 3-P). ~J:lhis was in 
reply to a letter notifying her of the judgment on Sep-
tember 21. Her motion to set aside the judgment was 
not made until October 30. 
The only other ground in her affidavit is based upon 
the mistaken notion that her divorce decree had absolved 
her of all liability for the real estate commission. She 
refused to consult eounsel, saying: 
''I would not bother my lawyer about it, nor 
will I pay any part of the commission.'' (Ex. P -3). 
Is this a reason that justifies relief from a judgment ? 
Does the law permit a person who so scorns the process 
of the court and refnsc•s to ''bother'' her law~-er with 
process duly served upon her, to eome into court vdth 
no more showing than this affidavit and set aside a 
judgment entered against her nearly one year before'? 
The cases all deny such a right. The courts even deny 
relief where the fault is the attorney's and not the 
person served. 
In all of the following California cases, the trial 
court set aside default judgments and the appellate 
court held the trial court abused its discretion in so 
doing and reinstated the judgments. In Sharmwn L'S. 
Jorgensen, 39 P. 863, the attorney thought he had filed 
the answer, but inadvertently failed to do so. In Durbow 
vs. Chesley, 141 P. 631, the defendant attorney failed to 
file an appearance due to a mistaken understanding that 
the case was consolidated with other actions. In Ross vs. 
San Diego Glazed Pipe Co., 194 P. 1059, attorney forgot 
to answer counterclaim. 
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In Coleman vs. Rankin, 37 Calif. 247, the defendant 
lost the summons and failed to answer it on time. The 
court refused to set aside the default judgment. In 
T~V einuerger vs. Cummings, 123 P. (2d) 531 the court in 
refusing to set aside a default judgment said: 
''All persons in possession of their normal 
faculties, capable of engaging in business trans-
actions, must conform with, and be guided by, the 
rules and regulations of legal procedure.'' 
The controlling Utah cases concur in the rulings of 
the California courts. In Peterson vs. Crosier, 29 Utah 
2:1;); 81 P. 860 the court held that a default judgment 
would not be set aside because of mere carelessness, lack 
of attention, or indifference on the part of. the defendant 
or her attorney. ~Irs. Harrison not only scorned the 
servic<' of process and refused to even ''bother'' her 
attorney, but ignored the notice sent her of the judgment 
entered against her. In the Crosier case the court denied 
the defendant's motion to set aside the judgment on the 
ground that his attorneys neglected to appear. The 
court said: 
''The moving party must show that he used 
due diligence to prepare and appear for trial and 
was prevented from doing so because of some 
accident, misfortune, or combination of circum· 
stances over "·hich he had no control. If, how-
ever, the record discloses mere carelessness, lack 
of attention, or indifference to his rights on the 
part of the applicant or his counsel, he cannot 
expect an opportunity to redeem his past." Peter-
son vs. Crosier, 81 P. 860, 862. 
In the ease of J1Jc1Yhirter z·s. Donaldson, 36 Utah 
293, 104 P. 731 the court affirmed and expounded this 
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rule denying relief. It is hard to conceive of a fact situa-
tion which impels the denial of relief more than the case 
of Alda J. I-Iarrison. There is no mistake or excusable 
mistake. She simply scorned the process and refused 
to "bother" her lawyer. Surely if the error or neglect 
of an attorney resulting in a judgment against an inno-
cent person is not grounds for relief, the refusal to even 
consult an attorney or answer a complaint is not a 
ground for relief. 
In Warren vs. Dixon Ra;nch Co., 29 Utah 235; 260 
P. (2d) 741, the court refused to set aside a default judg-
ment resulting from the company's process agent's 
neglect in failing to notify the company of the service 
of the summons. The court said: '' ... the movant must 
show that he has used due diligence and that he was 
prevented from appearing by circumstances over which 
he had no control" ( P. 7 43). Certainly there were no 
circumstances preventing Alda J. Harrison from 
"bothering" her lawyer or answering the process. If a 
plaintiff can be deprived of a judgment on these facts, 
then no plaintiff can rely on a default judgment obtained 
from our courts and every person is free to ignore 
process with safety. 
The lower court's order setting aside the judgment 
obtained against Alda J. Harrison should be reversed 
and the judgment reinstated. 
POINT II. 
'rHE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE 
WAS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN WASATCH 
HO~IES, INC. AND THE DEFENDANTS. 
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The court in announcing its judgment in this case 
ruled against the plaintiff on the sole ground that since 
there was no listing agreement between the real estate 
broker and the defendants, there was never a contractual 
relationship between them which could support recovery. 
The testimony of the defendants themselves firmly 
establishes the plaintiff's case. -:\Irs. Harrison testified 
as follows: 
1. l\lrs. Harrison asked the real estate company to 
sell the Snow Apartments for her. 
"Q. Who did you ask if they would help youf 
''A. This Wasatch Homes ; I think they call 
it 'Wasatch.' 
"Q. That ::\lr. Dean Parry~ 
"A. Yes." (R. 22) 
2. :Mrs. Harrison signed the earnest money receipt 
and agreement (Ex. 1) twice after being signed by all 
parties to the receipt and agreement. It contained all 
the writing at the time she signed that is no-w upon it. 
"Q. In any eYent, all the writing above your 
signature was on the paper at the time you signed 
here beneath the name of G. T. Harrison~ 
"A. \Yell, as far as I know." (R. 25) 
3. :Mrs. Harrison went to the offices of \Yasatch 
Homes, Inc., the real estate broker, and executed the 
final papers in accordance with the terms of the earnest 
mone~· receipt and agreement, and accepted payment 
from the buyers. 
'' Q. ~Irs. Harrison, after Exhibit 1 was 
sig1wd, you came to the offices of \Yasatch Homes 
for the purpose of signing the final documents, 
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didn't you, and your husband refused to come; 
is that correct 1 
"A. Yes, I think that was correct." (R. 26) 
'' Q. And you remember meeting with l\IIr. and 
Mrs. Asp and going over the closing? 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. -and signing the final papers~ 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. -the final contract of sale; don't you f 
Don't you remember that? 
''A. Yes, I think I remember that. '' ( R. 27) 
1Ir. Harrison's testimony also establishes the plain-
tiff's case. 
1. When the earnest money receipt and agreement 
was signed by G. T. Harrison, the agreement was signed 
by Dean Parry for Wasatch Homes. 
'' Q. Was there anything else that wasn't on 
there when you signed it~ 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. What is that? 
''A. Let me see - well, I think it is sub- , 
stantially the same otherwise." (R. 77) 
2. G. T. Harrison himself wrote in the clause on 
the earnest money agreement, agreeing to the commis-
sion and specifying the amount to be paid the real estate 
broker. 
3. G. T. Harrison executed the final papers closing 
the sale with the buyers supplied by the real estate 
company. (R. 87) (R. 90) 
The plaintiff submits that the earnest money agree-
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ment (Ex. 1) is a sufficient memorandum to take the 
transaction out of the Statute of Frauds. It is a complete 
written agreement between the buyer, seller, and real 
estate broker. The broker is entitled to recover the com-
mission and a reasonable attorney's fee in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement. 
CONCLUSIOK 
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed. 
rrhe judgment against the defendant, Alda J. Harrison, 
should be reinstated and judgment entered against G. T. 
Harrison. The lower court should be directed to assess 
a reasonable attorney's fee against the defendant, G. T. 
Harrison. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDOX I. HYDE, 
Counsel for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
863 First Security Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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